Company: Evolution AB

Ticker: EVO

Sector: Consumer Cyclical

Industry: iGaming

Market Cap: €11.5B

Estimated Fair Value: €68–€90

Date: 22 December 2025

Executive Summary

Evolution AB represents an attractive long-term investment opportunity. The market is currently penalizing the company for issues that, in my view, do not reflect any structural deterioration in the business.

Evolution is a global leader in the iGaming industry, particularly in the Live Casino segment, which benefits from structurally higher margins. The company operates with strong and durable competitive advantages, consistently generating value through high ROIC well above its cost of capital, superior margins relative to the industry, and sustained growth. In addition, the balance sheet is exceptionally strong, with no financial debt.

Based on my estimates, EVO offers the potential for a total return of approximately 53% over the next three years, excluding dividends. This is a long-term position in a business of high quality.

Company Overview

Evolution AB is a B2B iGaming company, with Live Casino accounting for 86% of revenues in 2024, while RNG products represent the remaining 14%. The company’s growth is driven by expansion into regulated markets (such as the US, Brazil, and Colombia), continuous product innovation, the launch of new games, the expansion of studios and tables, and the structural shift toward mobile gaming (from 13% of revenues in 2014 to 71% in 2024).

Additional growth vectors include solutions for land-based casinos and selective, well-executed acquisitions.

Evolution benefits from significant economies of scale and moderate customer stickiness. These structural competitive advantages are further reinforced by a mild network effect, intellectual property, technological and regulatory expertise, brand strength, and a strong reputation for execution.

The industry itself presents meaningful barriers to entry for new competitors attempting to operate at scale, particularly in Live Casino, where market share in Europe has remained stable and ROIC consistently exceeds 15%.

Investment Thesis

In my view, Evolution is currently undervalued. The market appears to be pricing in excessive pessimism related to two main factors: potential failure in the Asia market and a perceived slowdown in growth.

While Evolution has faced genuine challenges related to cyberattacks, the company has reinforced its security infrastructure and, so far, these issues have not resulted in material operational impact. At the same time, although revenue growth is naturally decelerating as the business matures (having grown at a 45% CAGR since 2015), this does not undermine the strength of the underlying business model.

These concerns, in my opinion, overshadow Evolution’s core fundamentals: high and expanding margins, strong growth, durable competitive advantages, and multiple long-term growth drivers.

Valuation

My primary valuation reference is the Free Cash Flow to Firm (FCFF) yield, which stands at more than twice the yield of 10-year German government bonds (used as a proxy for the risk-free rate): 9.5% vs. 2.7%.

To complement this, I rely on several additional valuation frameworks:

Reverse DCF

The market is implicitly assuming long-term growth of approximately 4% per year. While possible, I consider this outcome unlikely given Evolution’s fundamentals and growth drivers. Assuming 10% annual growth and a 12.5% discount rate (reflecting industry risks), I estimate an intrinsic value of €81, implying a 41% margin of safety.

Earnings Power Value (EPV)

This approach yields an intrinsic value of €68, effectively assigning no value to future growth and still offering a 19% margin of safety.

Gordon Growth Model

Using analyst consensus growth of 5.6% and a 12.5% discount rate, this model results in an intrinsic value of €90, representing a 58% margin of safety.

Overall, I estimate Evolution’s intrinsic value to lie between €68 and €90, with a midpoint around €80, corresponding to a 28% margin of safety.

Valuation Multiples

• P/E (TTM): 9.7 vs. 10-year average of 24

• EV/FCF (TTM): 8 vs. 10-year average of 45

• EV/EBIT (TTM): 8 vs. 10-year average of 12.6

Risk / Reward Framework

Bear Case (20% probability)

Adverse regulation materially damages the business model, the Asian market collapses, and margins compress to 60–62%. Under this scenario, EPS is estimated at €5.3 and the P/E multiple contracts to 8–10x.

Base Case (60% probability)

Valuation multiples normalize below the historical average. North America continues to grow, Asia stabilizes, and margins settle between 65–68%. EPS is estimated at €5.3, with a P/E range of 15–18x.

Bull Case (20% probability)

Regulation becomes more favorable, North America accelerates, new game launches succeed, margins expand to 68–70%, and the valuation returns closer to historical levels. EPS remains at €5.3, while the P/E multiple expands to 22–26x.

The current valuation reflects multiple negative narratives: fears around Asia (cybersecurity problems), Q3 2025 results that missed expectations, slight EBITDA margin compression, limited institutional ownership due to the “sin stock” label, and a broader growth slowdown.

However, the company’s structural fundamentals remain intact. Evolution continues to generate high margins, strong ROIC, and robust free cash flow. In my view, the bad news is already fully priced in.

Conclusion:

The setup offers a highly asymmetric risk/reward profile, with an estimated 16:1 risk/reward ratio, an 80% probability of upside, and potential returns of 53% over the next three years (excluding dividends). Downside risk is mitigated by strong competitive advantages, a healthy balance sheet, and valuation multiples at historical extremes that tend to mean-revert.

Key Risks

Regulatory Risk

This is the primary and most structural risk. Regulatory changes can be binary and may force market exits. Evolution mitigates this risk by focusing on regulated markets and leveraging extensive experience with Tier 1 licenses, including the UK and Malta.

Geographic Risk

The company has significant exposure to regulated European markets. However, Evolution has operated in Europe for many years and holds multiple Tier 1 licenses.

Take Rate Pressure

Large operators possess greater negotiating power, potentially impacting pricing. This risk could increase if the B2C industry consolidates further. Nevertheless, Evolution’s dominant position in Live Casino and moderate switching costs provide some protection.

Management and Capital Allocation

Evolution is led by a stable executive team, with an average tenure exceeding 10 years. Management has meaningful “skin in the game,” with founders still involved at the board level and insider ownership totaling 11.5%, of which 10.5% is held by the two founders.

The company has a strong history of shareholder value creation, consistently generating ROIC above its cost of capital. Acquisitions have been well integrated and have contributed to core business growth, particularly through margin and ROIC expansion since 2020. Capital allocation prioritizes reinvestment, followed by dividends and share buybacks.

Catalysts

In the short to medium term, upside catalysts include continued expansion in newly regulated markets, particularly in North America and Latin America, as well as stabilization in the Asian market.

Pre-Mortem

This investment thesis would be challenged by more restrictive regulation combined with social pressure (especially in Europe), a collapse of the Asian market, increased pricing pressure from large operators, rising labor costs due to employee dependence, or aggressive competition from broader entertainment companies reducing the relevance of Live Casino.

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1. The Company

1.1. History

Games Workshop PLC (GAW) was founded in 1975 by John Peake, Ian Livingstone and Steve Jackson in London. Originally it built traditional board games, but very early on it secured the rights to sell the RPG game Dungeons & Dragons in Europe (this game became a worldwide success and defined a genre). To promote its games and create a community, it launched in 1977 a newsletter called Owl and Weasel which developed into White Dwarf magazine, still existing today.

In 1979 it merged with the company Citadel Miniatures led by Brian Ansell, to produce metal miniatures with the aim of creating its own board games, which happened in 1983 with the launch of Warhammer Fantasy Battle and in 1987 with Warhammer 40K, games that became immensely popular and defined the company’s direction.

In 1991 a management buyout of the company occurred, led by Tom Kirby and Brian Ansell (former owner of Citadel Miniatures. Founders left the scene). These 2 individuals focused the company on its intellectual property, Warhammer Fantasy Battle and Warhammer 40K. This change targeted younger customers, expanding the presence of its products in Europe, North America and Australia.

In 1994 GAW was acquired by a private investment company, ECI Partners, and subsequently was listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), becoming public.

In 1997, all operations were moved to Nottingham in the United Kingdom, where Warhammer World was created and developed, an event center and hub for enthusiasts.

Since the 2000s, Games Workshop has expanded its product line, including the licensing of production and distribution of the Lord of the Rings board game and new game systems, such as Warhammer Age of Sigmar, introduced in 2015.

It is known worldwide for its miniature battle games and related products, having more than 500 official stores globally and recognized for its strong community that is created through events and tournaments.

It is headquartered in Nottingham and is listed on the LSE, having in 2024 entered the UK’s 100 largest companies (FTSE100 Index).

1.2. Business Model

The company is vertically structured, meaning it controls its entire value chain, from sourcing raw materials, through creation, manufacturing, distribution and sale of its products.

It reports its sales in 2 segments:

• Core (everything related to the sale of miniatures, books, rules, accessories, etc.)

• Licensing (authorization to use its intellectual property by third parties)

Regarding sales channels, the company reports in the following channels (Core Business. FY 2025):

• Retail (official stores -- 570 stores in 24 countries)

• Trade (independent physical and/or online stores -- 8100 accounts in 71 countries)

• Online (official online store)

In geographic terms, the company reports sales in the following regions (Core Business. FY 2025):

• North America

• UK

• Europe

• Australia and New Zealand

• Asia

Distribution of sales by segment (FY 2025):

• Core: 93.6%

• Licensing: 6.4%

Distribution of sales by sales channel (Core Business. FY 2025):

• Retail: 22.7%

• Trade: 57.5%

• Online: 19.8%

Distribution of sales by geographic region (Core Business. FY 2025):

• North America: 43.59%

• UK: 21.65%

• Europe: 24.1%

• Australia and New Zealand: 6.2%

• Asia: 13.4%

• Rest of the world: 0.85%

Distribution of official stores by geographic region (Core Business. FY 2025):

• North America: 201

• UK: 134

• Europe: 167

• Australia and New Zealand: 48

• Asia: 20

As can be observed from the sales distribution, the Core segment, the Trade distribution channel (independent accounts increased 113% between 2016 and 2025, going from 3800 to 8100) and the North American market are those that carry the most weight in the company’s sales.

The miniatures are mostly produced in plastic (Citadel Miniatures), with miniatures also produced in resin (Forge World), this being a premium range. Sales also include books from the Warhammer world (Black Library) that help contextualize and expand the LORE (Warhammer universe). In addition to these products, the company has recurring sales from its Warhammer+ platform, which allows subscribers access to exclusive content, such as animations, miniatures, etc...

The licensing segment is carried out through transferring the rights to use the Warhammer brand to third parties, in exchange for payment of an initial amount, future amounts according to performance metrics and royalties. Most of the sales from this segment come from video games, however GAW entered into a contract with Amazon in 2025 to develop series and films about the Warhammer universe.

Games Workshop has its production/creation infrastructure based in Nottingham, including 3 factories (miniature production and painting. A fourth factory is under development), 2 warehouses, Warhammer studio (creation and development of intellectual property) and central office.

In logistics terms, the final product leaves the factories for a warehouse near Nottingham (East Midland Gateway), from which it is distributed to two large distribution centers in Memphis (USA) and Sydney (Australia), also having two smaller centers, one in Japan and another in China. These centers supply the various official and independent stores that exist in the various regions.

1.3. Culture

From my analysis, the company’s culture is very strong, based on passion for the Warhammer LORE and the hobby. The staff, especially those linked to content production, manufacturing and store operators, were or are Warhammer collectors/players.

However, from what I studied, I got the idea that there was a culture before (stronger) and another after the company became public, with a greater focus on the business component (profit margins, sales targets, timings for product creation) which evidenced some clash between the LORE creators and management teams. This led to the departure of very important figures from the company, from game designers, creators, painters, who had been with the company for decades.

Much of this business-oriented focus was introduced by the 1st CEO Tom Kirby (quite hated by the community). He distributed among the staff the famous “little red book”, written by him, which established guidelines for what Games Workshop was, his vision for the company and what should be the behavior and posture of those who worked there. From what I researched, most of the former employees found it unhealthy, with the 2nd CEO considering it the best business management book that ever existed.

The fact that in the company’s history since it became public it has only had 3 CEOs (Tom Kirby 1991-2008, Mark Wells 2008-2014 and Kevin Rountree since 2015), and each with considerable time in office and with distinct but LORE development-focused ways of thinking, I think helps with this cultural definition of the company.

As a conclusion of my analysis of this topic, I think there are indeed 2 very strong cultures in the company, one based on passion for the Warhammer LORE and the hobby and another motivated by operational efficiency of the business and its expansion. The 2 live together but don’t always get along well.

1.4. Executive Team

In 2025 the company’s executive structure is as follows:

• Kevin Rountree -- CEO (+10 years in office)

• Liz Harrison -- CFO (1 year in office)

• Neil Tomlinson -- COO (less than 1 year in office)

The executive team owns less than 1% of the company’s shares, I would prefer to see greater ownership, around 3%, being more an indicator of the executive team’s alignment with shareholders.

The executive team turnover (except CEOs) is 3.5 years. I estimate that this tenure in executive positions is at the average of the mid-caps that make up the FTSE100 index. However, I would also like to see a higher number of years.

The company prioritizes internal promotion for filling executive positions rather than hiring externally. All current executive directors were promoted internally, and already had many years at the company (positive sign).

From my research, the current CEO shows strong leadership and long-term vision, with operator characteristics, participating in the management of daily operational activities with focus on practical implementation of the strategy (positive sign).

The Stock Based Compensation program is based on performance metrics linked to gross and operating profit margins. This program has represented less than 1% of sales since 2021. However, it has increased, which contributes to shareholder dilution. It is reported as an operating expense in the company’s reports. (This topic still requires further analysis to verify in greater detail the metrics linked to this compensation program and the extent of dilution and respective cost).

The board of directors is mostly made up of independent directors.

1.5. Customers

Customers are essentially players and collectors, ranging from casual players to tournament participants. The average age is around 30 years with players between ages 12 to 50+ years. GAW also has a fragmented base of independent retailers who sell its products, with about 8100 accounts in various geographic areas.

1.6. Industry

Representation of the Tabletop Miniature Wargaming industry map:

• Miniatures (Manufacturing and IP owners): Games Workshop (Warhammer, Age of Sigmar), Privateer Press (Warmachine, Hordes), Corvus Belli (Infinity), Warlord Games (Bolt Action, historical range), Mantic Games (Kings of War, Deadzone)

• Rules and Publications: Games Workshop (Warhammer rules, Codexes), Privateer Press (rules, expansions), Fantasy Flight Games (Star Wars Armada, X-Wings RPG), Osprey Publishing (Frostgrave, historical wars)

• Retail and Distribution: Games Workshop (official stores, direct sales model), Independent hobby-related stores, online platforms (Miniature Market, Wayland Games, Element Games)

• Software and Digital Tools: Warhammer+ (Games Workshop streaming service, digital rules and tools), BattleScribe (army builder), tabletop game simulators (wargaming in digital environment), Dungeons & Dragons (RPG rules)

• Accessories and Resources: Citadel (Games Workshop paints, brushes, hobby resources), Army Painter (paints, sprays and other materials), Vallejo (paints, tools), Green Stuff World (tools, sculpture)

As can be seen, Games Workshop is located across the entire industry spectrum. Most of the remaining companies are small businesses (compared to GAW) and private.

I estimate that the industry has barriers to entry for new companies that want to compete for the profit margins of the larger companies (GAW being the largest company dedicated exclusively to this hobby). However, for companies that don’t want to compete at the same level as the incumbents, these barriers will not exist, due to the low capital intensity of this industry (e.g. a small studio could with little initial investment create an online store, selling miniatures it produces using 3D printing).

This analysis is based on the fact that there have been no major changes in market leadership, revealing stability of market share and return on invested capital, historically high in the last decade. This conclusion refers only to the Miniatures segment represented on the map, as I consider it the most significant, and for the geographic areas of North America, Europe and UK, which I consider as the largest markets. I also note that GAW makes ROIC skyrocket and clearly dominates in terms of market share, and at least in this segment, I think GAW is the industry. This topic is addressed in more detail in the point regarding competitive advantages.

From my research I estimate that the Tabletop Wargaming industry has a Total Addressable Market (TAM) of $10.25B and the Tabletop Miniature Wargaming sub-segment (where GAW operates) has a TAM of $1.4B, evidencing a niche industry. Projections indicate annual growth of about 6% until 2035.

The growth of Fantasy and Sci-Fi themes (70s and 80s decades), the shift from historical recreation themes to themes developed by companies’ Intellectual Property (IP), the change from metal miniatures to plastic miniatures (90s), the internet and e-commerce (2000s), were historical disruptions, allowing growth in profits and community.

I consider that this industry has had gradual evolution throughout its history. Technology has been transforming the industry, mainly in the manufacturing process (3D printing and graphic design). In sales, products are distributed through e-commerce instead of only through physical stores, and the community has evolved through platforms like YouTube, Patreon, etc., which share the hobby worldwide.

2. Financial Performance

The following analysis refers to the period of fiscal years 2016 to 2025 (GAW’s fiscal year begins in June). I note that comparisons with the industry are only estimates and may have a considerable margin of error, since most are private businesses or subsidiaries of other companies, making it difficult to access accurate data on sales amounts, profit margins/returns.

2.1. Profit and Loss

• Sales: GAW has expanded its sales in the last decade, with annual growth around 20%, going from 118M GBP in 2016 to 617.6M GBP in 2025 (+17% vs 2024), growing every year. This growth has been decelerating, with the last 3 years at 14% per year.

The segment with the greatest weight in sales is Core (average of 94% of total in the last 5 years), presenting a value of 565M GBP in 2025 (+14% vs 2024). However, the greatest growth is in the licensing segment, having increased 27% per year since 2016. This segment presented sales of 53M GBP in 2025 (+71% vs 2024). I highlight that this value was greatly boosted by the success of the video game Space Marines 2, something that was already praised by the CEO, noting that in fiscal year 2026 sales should normalize.

The trade channel presented sales in 2025 of 346M GBP (+19% vs 2024), with annual growth since 2016 of 26%, presenting the highest growth of the distribution channels (retail 11.5% and online 15%). This channel is also the one with the greatest weight, representing on average in the last 5 years 57% of total sales (retail 22.6% and online 19.8%).

In geographic terms, the greatest growth was in Asia with an annual increase of 24% since 2016, followed very closely by the North American market with annual growth of 22%. The market with the greatest weight in GAW sales is North America with sales of 249M GBP in 2025 (+15% vs 2024) and representing on average in the last 5 years 43.6% of total Core segment sales, with the Australian and New Zealand regions having the least weight (6%).

In order to verify the growth phase each market is in, I performed an analysis of sales per store, with the North America region having the largest number of stores, 201 in 2025 (100 in 2016), UK with 134 (148 in 2016), Europe 167 (149 in 2016), Australia and NZ with 48 (46 in 2016) and Asia with 20 stores (8 in 2016). Store growth since 2016 was fastest in Asia (10.7% per year) and North America (8% per year), with the UK closing stores and the European market with small growth of 1.3% per year. Sales per store, the only region that has been accelerating its growth rate is Asia, with the American market presenting the lowest growth of the last 3 years at 6% since 2022.

Thus with this analysis I estimate that the North American market is the one of greatest importance to GAW in terms of sales size, however it is in a maturity phase, being the opposite of the Asian region which will be where GAW will focus its expansion program.

GAW also has recurring sales from its Warhammer+ platform created in 2021. I estimate it grew subscribers by 30% since 2022, going from 105 thousand subscribers in 2022 to 232 thousand in 2025. I calculate that the subscription price averages 6 pounds, resulting in revenues around 1.4M GBP in 2025 (for a platform that from what I read was not very well received by the community, the numbers aren’t bad).

Finishing with the factors that will be driving this growth, I estimate it is predominantly the increase in sales volume, increasing every year since 2016. GAW has also decided to increase prices every year, mostly an increase slightly above world inflation. In the Covid period (2019-2022), GAW managed to increase Core segment sales between 16% (2019) and 31% (2021), as well as increase the volume and price of its products. Here is a strong indication of customer loyalty and the differentiation strategy followed by GAW (this subject is developed in the point about competitive advantages).

• Gross Profit: Gross profits have expanded in the last decade at a rate of 16% per year, increasing every year. In 2025 they presented a value of 445M GBP.

• Operating Profit: Operating profit increased at a rate of 36% per year, having grown every year in the last decade. In 2025 it presented a value of 261M GBP. This growth was higher than sales, revealing an increase in business scale and operational efficiency.

• Net Profit: Net profits grew every year at a rate of 35% (similar to operating profit, only with the addition of non-operating revenues from investments and tax payments). In the last decade, operating cash flows were on average higher than net profits, indicating that the company’s income derives mainly from its core business (it has some income from cash investments)

• Net Profit per Share: Followed the trajectory of net profits (GAW does not have a stock buyback program).

• Operating Costs and Expenses: Sales costs increased from 44M GBP in 2016 to 173M GBP in 2025, representing annual growth of 16.5%. I estimate that its cost structure is mostly fixed (about 75% fixed), with administrative expenses (salaries, logistics, marketing, rent, etc.) being those with the greatest weight. This value should have been around 226M GBP in fixed costs and 75.5M GBP in variable costs (energy, tariffs, etc.).

Operating expenses increased 11.4% per year since 2016, going from 70M GBP in 2016 to 183.7M GBP in 2025. Breaking down these expenses in fiscal year 2025, reveals that Retail and Design, Manufacturing, Logistics and Operations represent the company’s largest expenses (37.7% and 32.5% of total respectively). Adjusting total operating expenses to ROU Assets (operating leases began to be reported in 2020) we obtain a value of 195.8M GBP in 2025.

Marketing expenses were on average in the last 3 years about 11.9M GBP. This value is within what is the company’s objective of maintaining the ceiling of marketing spending at 2% of Core segment sales. The marketing efficiency ratio in this period averaged 108 (generated on average 108 pounds in sales for every pound spent on marketing).

• Tax Rate: GAW’s tax rate has been around the statutory rate in the UK (20% until 2022 and 25% after 2022), revealing that GAW does not benefit from significant tax benefits.

• Profit Margins: Gross profit margin remained stable at 70%. I estimate it is considerably higher than the industry average (35% to 45%).

Operating profit margin expanded from 24% in 2016 to 42% in 2025, presenting an average of 35% in this period. Operating expenses grew at a considerably lower rate than sales growth (11% vs 20% respectively). I estimate it is much higher than the industry average (17%).

Net profit margin grew from 19% in 2016 to 32% in 2025, with an average of 28% in this period.

The Markup ratio (difference between the sale price and the product’s cost price) estimates that on average GAW in the last decade sold its products at a price 235% higher than the production cost price, this value increased to 250% in the last 3 years.

2.2. Balance Sheet

• Debt: One aspect I highlight is GAW not having debt, having as a priority the use of cash flows in profit distribution and capital investments.

It has obligations related to operating leases (ROU Assets valued at 44M GBP reported in 2025 in non-current assets) in the amount of 45.2M GBP (11.2M GBP in current obligations and 34M GBP in non-current) in 2025. The maturity schedule of these payments seems well distributed with 34.5% being between 2 and 5 years. GAW pays interest related to these leases, with the amount reaching 1.4M GBP in 2025. These payments were on average in the last decade covered by operating profits about 197x. Cash and equivalents cover these obligations about 3x.

• Operating Working Capital: This value was always positive in the last decade, with cash being consumed most of this period. Working capital increased from 14M GBP in 2016 to 72M GBP in 2025. Working capital occupied in 2025 about 45% of the company’s current assets, with the greatest weight in receivables (22.9%). In 2025 the company generated cash relative to the use of working capital in 2024, about 26M GBP.

One aspect to pay attention to is the fact that current receivables have grown at a higher rate than sales (31% vs 20%). However, a large part of these receivables belong to licensing contracts, with this value having a weight of 84% in non-current receivables and 31% in current receivables. GAW has a provision of 1.3M GBP for bad debt (5% of total receivables). The remaining receivables are mainly related to credits to trade accounts, with 1.5M GBP exceeding the payment term (up to 3 months).

At the end of fiscal year 2025 there was a write-off of 0.3M GBP. In my opinion, because receivables come mainly from licensing contracts that originate large amounts due to their structure, and as GAW has thousands of geographically diversified trade accounts, the risk of having a high amount of write-offs is minimized.

• Assets vs Liabilities: In the last decade, total assets were always higher than liabilities (on average 3x), as well as current assets always higher than current liabilities (current ratio > 3).

• Cash and Equivalents: This is the company’s largest asset (35% of total assets in 2025), having expanded in the last decade to a value of 132.6M GBP on the 2025 balance sheet. There was a large increase in this amount since 2022, due to licensing contracts (increased 86% since that year)

• Retained Earnings: Retained earnings expanded in the last decade from 46M GBP in 2016 to 255M GBP in 2025.

• Intangible Assets: In 2025, intangible assets, including Goodwill represented 6.5% of total assets. The amount of Goodwill on the balance sheet remained stable in the last decade at 1.4M GBP, representing in 2025 0.4% of total assets, evidencing the company’s focus on organic growth.

• Shareholder Equity: This amount expanded from 62.8M GBP in 2016 to 281M GBP in 2025, growing 16% per year in this period

• Returns: GAW presented on average in the last decade a return on its assets (ROA) of 35%, expanding annually at a rate of 12% per year. The value in 2025 was 51%, which I adjusted the calculations to only include fixed and operating assets, also adjusting net profit by removing revenues from investments (2.9M GBP) obtaining a value of 87%. I estimate these values are significantly higher than the companies that make up the FTSE100 index. In my opinion this fact reveals GAW’s efficiency in managing and using its assets.

ROE expanded in the last 7 years at a rate of 3% per year, presenting an average of 61%. This slight expansion had as its main driver the increase in net margin. However, in the last 3 years (it accelerated to annual growth of 8%) it is verified that the main driver of ROE has been increasing operational efficiency (Asset Turnover).

ROIC expanded in the last decade at a rate of 11% per year, presenting an average of 70% (89% in 2025). I estimate this value is substantially higher than the industry (industry ROIC should be around 20%). Breaking down ROIC, the driver of its growth has been operating profit margin after taxes (growth of 8.4% per year), this margin more than doubled since 2016 (15% to 33% in 2025). In terms of sales generated by invested capital (IC Turnover), growth was slower (1% per year), however there was an evolution in this ratio, in 2016 GAW for every pound invested generated 1.6 pounds in sales, and in 2025 generated 2.7 pounds. Through this analysis I think this fact evidences the management team’s focus on operational efficiency, and not so much on capital allocation (topic addressed in greater detail in the point about competitive advantages)

2.3. Cash Flows

• Operating Cash Flow: This item increased in the last decade at a rate of 29% per year, going from 44M GBP in 2016 to 247M GBP in 2025. This value increased every year since 2016.

• Capital Investments: In the last decade I estimate that investments were almost entirely dedicated to the company’s expansion (the model I use didn’t work for GAW, as the calculated investment dedicated to growth was higher than total investment. Possibly due to the annual mismatch between the increase in assets that year and respective sales growth, probably due to low capital intensity, sales growth is driven by capital allocation in previous years. Thus the Capital Intensity Ratio was adjusted to 0.6).

This focus of investments on company growth and operational efficiency is evidenced by the increase in sales at 20% per year and operating profits at 36% per year. The low capital intensity of this industry is verified in the respective ratio, estimating that GAW only needs to invest on average 0.6 pounds to generate 1 pound in sales.

Capital investments in the last 5 years were dedicated mainly to fixed assets (total of 167M GBP, 69% of total), with about 25% of this value being in miniature production equipment and tools (total of 41.5M GBP). About 31% of total investments were in intangible assets, mainly in Warhammer Studio (total of 68.6M GBP). These values are gross (don’t count with asset sales, depreciation/amortization or impairments).

I estimate that in the last decade, on average, invested capital represented about 3.5% of sales and 13.4% of free cash flows

• Free Cash Flow: In the last decade I estimate that free cash flows (adjusted for intangibles and unleveraged) showed expansion, going from 25M GBP in 2016 to 171M GBP in 2025. The growth rate of the last 3 years was 7% (using the last 3 years as reference, since GAW only started reporting operating leases on the balance sheet from 2020, affecting calculations due to asset differences before and after that year). This value was always positive.

Leveraged free cash flow adjusted for intangibles also expanded, going from 21M GBP in 2016 to 162M GBP in 2025, with annual growth in the last 3 years of 9%.

I estimate that in 7 of the last 10 years, unleveraged cash flows could not support all of the company’s capital allocation. For example in 2025, of the 171M GBP of free cash flow, 171M were allocated to dividend payments, 12.3M GBP to payments related to operating leases, and 20.6M GBP related to capital investment in growth initiatives, obtaining a negative balance of 33M GBP.

Although this is not the ideal situation I look for when analyzing a company’s free cash flows, I highlight the low capital intensity of the business model and the company managing to invest in growth while distributing an excess to shareholders in the form of dividends, without resorting to debt or equity issuance.

To support this, analyzing free cash flows and their distributions for cumulative values in the last 5 years, we obtain the value of 720M GBP in free cash flow and 728M GBP in distributions, meaning it almost fully covers profit distributions, however this value includes payments of obligations with operating leases, if these are removed distributions go to 666M GBP.

The analysis of this framework indicates to me that the company has a conservative capital structure and generates sufficient free cash flow, it is a mature company, as it distributes most of the cash flow to shareholders (91%) in the form of dividends, and has a prudent capital policy, not using debt issuance to sustain fund distribution, this fact reveals low operational volatility and high organic return.

Free cash flow represented in the last decade about 26% of sales, with the average in the last 3 years increasing to 33% (a very positive sign)

Regarding the conversion of profits into cash flows, this value averaged 84%, having expanded to 108% in the last 3 years (ideally values above 100%, however I consider values above 75% positive and the company has recently increased this value).

3. Operational Efficiency

• Ratios: The inventory to sales ratio increased slightly from 14.8x to 15.1x. Along with the decrease in the Day Sales Outstanding ratio in the last 3 years, they reveal that the company is managing to sell its products faster.

However here there is something that concerns me, which is the quality of profits obtained through these sales. It is verified that the company has had some difficulty in inventory management, especially in the years 2022 with provisions increasing 1077% and inventory write-offs increasing 207% (8.9M GBP) and in 2025 with an increase in provisions of 27% and write-offs increasing 133%. The management team seems to recognize this situation as a problem, in the case of 2022 the justification was in sales forecast failures, causing the company not to be able to feed demand, and in 2025 due to sales of new products not corresponding to projections.

Interpreting these factors together with the ratios presented above, I estimate that the company is indeed emptying shelves faster but using obsolete inventory sales, with this factor carrying costs for the company (e.g. the markup ratio drops because the margin on these products will be lower, discounted sales etc.), this fact may be degrading profit quality in the long term if these situations continue to recur, creating unnecessary pressures in partner warehouses, as well as frustration of Trade customers and hobby enthusiasts who see their needs not being met by the company.

I don’t know if the company’s old IT structure is the reason, with the company in a restructuring plan of the same, not only in terms of its implementation through investment, but also in its organization, no longer being under the dependence of the group’s financial director, but the operational director of manufacturing and distribution chains (I think it makes more sense).

It is certainly something to continue to observe closely.

Another ratio I consider very important in analyzing the efficiency of companies’ operational machinery is sales per employee. This ratio increased in the last decade, revealing that each employee produces more in 2025 than in 2016 (205 pounds vs 68 pounds in 2016). This value indicates not only a faster increase in sales than employees, but also that GAW can easily sustain staff costs, which are among the company’s largest fixed costs (costs with salaries, bonuses, etc.)

I highlight that one of the failures of this analysis is not being able to compare these numbers with the competition. But as in this niche I consider that in terms of operations scale there is no competition, GAW sets the pace.

4. Value Creation

• Economic Value (ROIC vs Cost of Capital): I estimate that GAW in the last decade has managed to create a positive economic spread, with an average of 59% in the last decade. I projected a cost of capital between 7% and 11%.

Consequently, this spread was accompanied by growing economic profit (34% per year since 2016), presenting an average of 90M GBP in the period studied (176M GBP in 2025). The economic margin was 24.6% on average.

I estimate that the high spread easily beat the return that British shareholders demanded to invest in stocks (estimate of 7.15% on average in the last decade)

• Return on Incremental Invested Capital (ROIIC): ROIIC was 96% in the last decade exceeding the ROIC average (70%), thus estimating that the company managed to better allocate each annual increment of capital obtaining better returns.

The ROIIC analysis estimated a reinvestment of about 17% of profits, with a return of 96%, projecting a fundamental growth of the company’s intrinsic value at 16.6%. I performed the calculation for 5 years and 3 years, in which I obtained 9.8% and 11% respectively. During these periods the reinvestment rate is noted to decrease (1.6% in the last 3 years), with fundamental growth being supported by incremental capital returns.

In these cases with high capital returns and low reinvestment rate, it becomes necessary to verify why the company doesn’t increase its reinvestment rate. Regarding GAW I propose 3 answers:

The 1st is that the industry where it operates is a niche, thus there aren’t as many opportunities to allocate all retained profits.

The 2nd is the company’s conservative policy, from what I analyzed it is noted that the management team doesn’t intend to leave its circle of competence, nor risk more risky investments (further opening the company to digital integration, venturing into acquisitions, etc.), this is also evidenced by the emergency fund that the company sets aside to deal with working capital expenses, among others (this topic is developed in the point about dividend profile). On the other hand, the company has a policy of distributing most profits to shareholders in the form of dividends, this generally occurs in companies in a maturity cycle, where they already have quite high returns.

I finish with the 3rd in the form of a question, if the company manages to obtain good growth, with good returns and profit margins, only reinvesting 17% of profits, why would it reinvest more and/or with greater risk?

Thus I consider that these 3 approaches, one motivated by external factors and the others by internal policies, contribute to justifying the low reinvestment rate.

The issue here is that this growth that the management team aspires to will not be free, and the company will have to continue investing in the business to keep pace with the industry’s evolution.

• Return on Retained Earnings: A simpler way to verify returns on capital invested by the company is the analysis of retained earnings compared to earnings per share, obtaining a return of 142%, where for every pound retained it generated 7.7 pounds in profits.

• The 1 Pound Test: This test comprises the study of how much business value is obtained for each pound invested in the business. I estimate that GAW passes this test with distinction, with on average in the last decade, for every pound invested it generated 14 pounds in business value.

• Growth: In my analysis I think the high growth that the company showed in the last decade created economic value. The facts I present are: it has strong and sustainable competitive advantages, presents good operational efficiency without great reinvestment needs, always positive and growing free cash flows, high ROIC higher than cost of capital with economic value creation. Allied to this I think the type of growth demonstrated by GAW is simply the best one can have in terms of value creation, organic and with high returns.

5. Competitive Advantages

• Competitive Environment: According to the industry map previously presented, I decided for now to analyze the existence of barriers to entry only for the Miniature Manufacturing and IP Owners sector, in the North American, European and UK markets, which I consider most relevant.

For this segment and North American market, I estimate that the 5 most relevant companies will be Games Workshop, Corvus Belli, Privateer Press (American company), Warlord Games and Mantic Games, which I estimate held 32% of market share in 2016 and 52% in 2024. Normalizing market share I obtained the estimate of 78% in 2016 and 92% in 2024 for Games Workshop, Privateer Press went from 12% to 3%, Warlord Games from 4.7% to 1.9%, Mantic Games from 3% to 1.7% and Corvus Belli, which has the smallest market share went from 2% to 0.8%.

As can be seen from the data above, there were no changes in the positioning of these companies in terms of market share, nor were there entries or exits of companies from the top 5.

The average ROIC of this group is high as it is determined by GAW, with a ROIC of 70% on average in the last decade, the others present ROICs between 12% (Corvus Belli) and 21% (Privateer Press). We consider that companies leading in this segment/region have high ROICs.

Looking at this segment, but in the European and UK markets, the same situation is verified, companies in the top 5 maintain positioning without major changes. With GAW being the only one with market share expansion in the 3 regions (North America +14.6%, Europe +5% and UK +2.7%).

These two factors, market share stability among top companies without considerable changes in their positioning and high ROICs, allow me to estimate that this segment and these markets have barriers to entry that defend incumbent companies from new companies that want to compete at the same level.

Failures pointed out in this analysis: these values are estimates, because with the exception of GAW, all companies are private and very small (Privateer Press the “largest” of these companies has estimated sales between $10M to $50M while GAW presented about $828M in 2025), making it difficult to obtain data. In addition to this fact, the ROIC calculation should be dedicated to the market under study, using only profits and capital invested in the region (difficult to decompose data by region).

• Existence of a Dominant Company: Given the above, I consider that GAW is the dominant company, with expanding market share and high ROIC, both items much higher than the competition. Thus I estimate that GAW has competitive advantages.

• Competitive Advantages: For the miniature manufacturing segment, regarding economies of scale, I estimate that about 75% of GAW’s production costs are fixed. Thus due to its global scale, profit margins considerably higher than the industry and local manufacturing process (manufacturing done entirely in the UK, Nottingham), allows GAW to decrease its costs per unit with increased sales. For these reasons I estimate that GAW has Economies of Scale.

GAW being the world’s largest miniature producer, it is estimated to have access to advantageous prices related to raw materials, tooling, among others (e.g. resin, plastics, metal, molds...), compared to the competition. Thus it manages to decrease production costs. In addition, its vertical business structure and scale allow it control of the entire value chain, contributing to increased operational efficiencies.

GAW has the largest and best-known intellectual property in the industry through the Warhammer LORE. Thus it manages to obtain a more profitable business model that allows it to monetize this universe.

Given these 2 factors described above, I estimate that GAW has competitive advantages regarding low production costs, related to access to raw materials and monetization of its intellectual property.

I estimate that customer loyalty by GAW is effected through switching costs. For example a warhammer player (estimated to represent about 20 to 40% of customers) needs to invest between $500 to $1200 to be able to participate competitively in a wargaming tournament. On the other hand, miniature collectors (80% to 60% of customers) tend to consume more individual miniatures from the Forge World universe (GAW’s premium range) where each miniature can reach 300 euros. In addition, we also have to count the time invested in creating armies/collections and the social relationships created. Thus all the investment made causes reluctance of enthusiasts to change to other alternatives.

The center of this hobby is the community (increasingly influential) and social interaction. Thus the habit created of playing warhammer (strongest LORE in the industry) and all the social relationship and belonging component that is created from it, causes reluctance in changing to other games.

I think this loyalty also allows GAW to have some pricing power, managing to increase prices without loss of sales volume, something the company has done in the last decade, having been verified that sales volume was the component that most contributed to annual growth in the last 10 years (I estimate the company pursues a strategy involving product differentiation promoting the idea that customers are getting greater value for the price paid than other options in the market)

I consider there are other competitive advantages, which although not as strong, allow strengthening those previously mentioned, such as:

I estimate that GAW has a slight network effect. This is produced by its size and status in the industry. By presenting the largest number of players, and being the best-known LORE, it is more likely that those interested in starting this hobby are more exposed to the warhammer universe than other games (it is estimated that about 80% of miniature wargaming customers in the UK are dedicated to warhammer, 60% to 75% in North America and 60% to 75% in Europe).

This industry is still a niche industry, with an estimated TAM of $1.4B. Thus GAW benefits from its scale (sales exceeding 600M GBP in 2025), to serve a large part of this market.

• Type of Competitive Advantages: I estimate that the competitive advantages stated are linked to GAW’s reinvestment capacity (from geographic expansion with opening of new stores, investment in state-of-the-art fixed assets in production, staff, IP development, etc.). However, the ROIIC analysis indicated a reinvestment in the last decade of about 17% of profits. Very low value for the growth demonstrated by the company, which reveals the low capital intensity of the business, allied to internal investment policies. I consider that because GAW presents very high profits and returns and the reinvestment it has made, I think it is in a maturity stage, where investment opportunities that move the needle are scarcer, with competitive advantages based on the legacy built.

There are other essential questions, one is GAW’s ability to maintain its production locally in the UK, since if it decides to move manufacturing to other countries (to reduce costs or better satisfy the expansion program) it could break its fixed cost structure, as well as its control in the value chain, affecting its operational efficiency and weakening its economies of scale. The very growth of the segment and expansion program could enhance the decrease in the gap between GAW and new companies, regarding operating costs (TAM growth always harms incumbent companies).

• Summary: Given the above, I think GAW has the strongest combination that exists in terms of competitive advantages, these being Economies of Scale and Customer Loyalty.

These two advantages together allow defending its profits from the rest of the competition (e.g. a competing company that wants to steal market share from GAW with a strategy of lowering prices, GAW can follow this decrease, and as it has the largest market share, loyal customers and low production costs, it will manage to maintain its margins. However, the competing company will only be able to lower prices to a certain point, where revenues no longer cover costs. And if GAW wants to eliminate that same company, it just needs to decrease prices more aggressively, removing it from the market)

6. Dividend Profile

GAW has distributed profits to shareholders through dividends since 2006, without interruptions. The company does not present a history of consecutive dividend increases (it did not increase in 9 of the last 20 years), due to its variable distribution policy. However, it presents annual dividend growth in the last decade of 25% (exceeds my current benchmark of 7% to 13% annual growth), going from 0.45 GBP in 2016 to 5.4 GBP in 2025.

This dividend policy is based on profit distribution, after setting aside a reserve to sustain 3 months of working capital and other operating costs (defined by the company in 2025 as a value of 85M GBP), 3 months of taxes and acquisitions or employee bonus program in a value exceeding 1M GBP.

In the last decade the payout ratio relative to net earnings per share averaged 85%, and relative to free cash flows was 103%.

Given what I analyzed and despite not being the ideal situation, the low capital need to sustain growth, low volatile cash flows and conservative capital structure, I don’t consider this item an eliminatory factor and that, at this moment, puts the distribution of profits to shareholders in dividends at risk, although it should be a point to monitor.

When performing the model that projects the company’s ability to increase the dividend annually by 7% for the next decade, I estimate that for a Div Yield of 3.6% (average of the last 5 years) and a payout ratio of 85% (average of the last 5 years), the company will have to grow its EPS 9% per year until 2035 with a starting base of EPS at the end of fiscal year 2025. Comparing with data from the last 10 years, EPS grew 23% per year, with the last 5 years presenting growth of 10%. Changing the projected dividend growth to 4% per year, EPS would have to grow 5.6%, with a total return of 109% vs 175% with the 7% projection for growth. Given what was presented and seeing the discrepancy between the fundamental growth projected for EPS (4%) and for intrinsic value (16%), looking at growth values from 2016 to 2025, allied to a low capital intensity business model and expanding, I think the company has the capacity to double its dividend value by 2035.

7. Risks

• These are the main risks I consider for GAW:

  • Intellectual Property (IP) Protection: The use of 3D printing increases the risk of copies of GAW miniatures being sold in the parallel market (identified by the company)

  • Cybersecurity: A cyber attack can jeopardize IT infrastructure, affecting company operations (identified by the company)

  • Distribution Chain Disruption: The company depends on key distributors globally. A disruption in the distribution chain could jeopardize company operations (e.g. Covid period. Identified by the company)

  • Loss of Key Infrastructure: The company having a vertical structure depends on its production and storage infrastructure in Nottingham and Memphis (identified by the company)

  • Licensing with Amazon: Execution risk. If the content is poorly received by the community, it could jeopardize the strength of IP and consequently affect its future monetization through licensing.

  • Exposure to Currency Risk: Almost 80% of sales come from outside the UK, with the dollar being the most significant currency. The company has no hedging program to mitigate this risk.

  • Reinvestment Policy: The company reinvested about 17% of profits in the last decade. Despite being a value within what the industry presents (capital not very intensive), the decrease of this reinvestment or not increasing it could cause the inability to keep up with community demands. Allied to few opportunities to allocate capital with good returns (niche industry), are the company’s conservative policy (slow to integrate digital) and the policy of distributing excess cash to shareholders through dividends, which cements this risk

  • Aggressive Expansion: The company may not be prepared for logistical pressures and inventory management when deciding to perform too rapid expansion, both geographically and in successive launch of new products, with its fixed assets unable to keep up with this strategy, jeopardizing its operational efficiency (years 2022 and 2025).

  • Degradation of Relationship with Community: With the community having increasingly more influence on LORE, serving as the great marketing engine, the occurrence of an erosion of the relationship with the company (as already happened in the Tom Kirby era) related for example to high prices, poor customer support and product availability, could increase fan loss, decrease competitive advantages and degradation of financial results. Adding to this situation, the aggressive and irrational defense of its IP through litigation processes against independent retailers, YouTubers, among others, for infringing copyright will provoke situations that don’t speak well of brand reputation, potentially creating ruptures with the real sales engine which are independent retailers and the rest of the community.

  • Tariffs: The company’s largest market is North America (44% of sales in 2025). The company projects an impact of about 2% on gross margin and 12M GBP on operating profit, for 2026. The company’s ability to minimize the impact of Trump’s tariff increases with operational efficiencies will be the only brake on this cost.

8. Growth Vectors

• These are the growth vectors I consider as main for GAW:

  • Geographic Expansion: objective of opening a total of 35 new stores in 2026, in Europe, North America and Asia.

  • Monetization of its IP: Licensing IP to Amazon for production of series and films, which can make the Warhammer LORE known to thousands of people.

9. Valuation

• As of the date of this analysis I obtained the following metrics that I consider as main in my valuation model:

  • FCF Yield (TTM) = 3.6% < benchmark (6.9%)

  • Dividend Yield = 3.8% < benchmark (5%)

  • Projected Total Return = 14.8% > benchmark (10%)

• Complementary valuation models:

  • Dividend Discount Model Fair Value = 174 GBP > Current market price

  • Reverse DCF: In my analysis, for a discount rate of 12% and terminal growth of 3%, the market is imputing growth of 19% in the company’s free cash flows.

FCF yield (FCFF/EV) is considerably below the minimum benchmark I consider as an entry point (50% > 10Y UK Gilt Bond Yield)

Dividend yield is slightly above the average of the last 5 years (3.6%) but without a considerable margin of safety. In this specific situation and considering that the reference is the FTSE100 dividend yield which is already above 3%, I consider this condition satisfied.

The projected return is above my reference (10%) with a considerable margin of safety.

In the intrinsic value calculation models, the DDM and Reverse DCF are not in agreement. I consider that in the Reverse DCF model, the growth that the market imputes to the company and is reflected in its current price is too optimistic. I would consider more conservative growth, around that estimated by ROIC and reinvestment rate (about 9% based on 3-year estimates).

In conclusion, and giving priority to my key valuation points, I don’t consider that GAW is at a good entry point.

10. Conclusion

The analysis of Games Workshop revealed a company with a history that involves it in the birth of a hobby, which ended up becoming a niche industry, but with a loyal and growing follower base.

A company with a strong culture and leadership, even if sometimes internal and external conflicts exist, evidenced by the relationship between creative teams and financial management teams and with its community, being almost a love/hate relationship.

I saw a business model with a vertical structure, which demonstrates not giving up the pursuit of quality of its products and development of the Warhammer universe, but at the same time pursues operational efficiency, trying to achieve good profit margins and returns on capital it invests.

I saw the dimension of its intellectual property, which is extremely strong, with a globally recognized brand and that for many defines the industry.

Financially, with data from the last decade, I saw a company that grew immensely, with sales growing at 20% per year and operating profit increasing 35% per year. High profit margins, with gross margin averaging 70% and operating margin of 33%.

A healthy balance sheet, evidenced by its conservative capital structure. A company that has no debt, has the flexibility to withstand bad times and invest when markets are in recession.

I verified in the company the ability to generate free cash flows, always presenting positive and growing numbers (growth at about 10% per year in the last 3 years).

A company that works efficiently, evidenced not only by margins, but also by the expansion of its employees’ productivity.

Consistent economic value creation, evidenced mainly by the high spread between returns on invested capital and cost of capital, which allied to a high ROIC and organic growth, evidences the quality of the business model.

I analyzed the competitiveness of the tabletop miniature wargaming industry in fundamental markets for the growth of this hobby during its history (North America, Europe and UK), and verified the existence of barriers to entry. Any company can start in the business whose initial capital needs will not be limiting, however, achieving large scale and aspiring to steal market share and profits from incumbent companies is another story. Given my analysis, Games Workshop is the only dominant company.

I estimate that its competitive advantages are among the strongest that a company can have to defend its returns. Economies of scale and customer loyalty allow defending Games Workshop from competition.

The dividend profile doesn’t fully suit what I normally look for, which are consecutive dividend increases by companies. However, Games Workshop has a good history of successive dividend payments, with more than 20 years.

Annual dividend growth in the last 5 years (25%) allied to its average dividend yield (3.6%) are also positive factors.

The company presents some growth vectors, in this niche industry. Its geographic expansion, through opening official stores, as well as monetization of its intellectual property, evidenced by its most recent contract with Amazon, could continue to support the growth demonstrated in the last decade.

Of course it’s not only positive aspects. Games Workshop has some weaknesses, in which I highlight the difficulty in inventory management, especially in extreme scenarios, where ineffectiveness in sales and stock projections cause logistical difficulties and raise questions about the quality of its profits. In addition to these factors, the company’s ambition to expand geographically could strengthen these difficulties, leading the executive team to make decisions that break with the fixed cost structure, jeopardizing its economies of scale (e.g. expanding its manufacturing infrastructure outside the UK).

The dependence on key suppliers could cause disruptions in the distribution chain, seriously affecting company operations.

The company has some risks related to its growth. The niche industry and the company’s conservative policies, which have prevented a reinvestment rate of profits higher than that estimated in the last decade (only 16%), could, in case of a decrease in growth, lead the executive team to make decisions that lead to entry into areas that leave their core knowledge, or into unbridled acquisitions that endanger the company’s competitive advantages.

The monetization of its intellectual property is something that, in my opinion, will be put to the test when Amazon begins to release content related to the Warhammer universe. If the execution of this project fails, it could jeopardize the true strength of the brand and future licensing contracts.

Given the above, Games Workshop reveals itself to be a company with a quality and robust business model, which despite having some challenges ahead, has everything to continue its dominant journey in this industry. I consider it would be a good acquisition for my business portfolio, however, I await a more favorable entry point.